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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.

Case No. 950383-CA

:

SHANE DOYLE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
gyRIgpiCTION AflP NATWE OF PRPCggPHWS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of
methamphetaTnine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) and (5) (Supp. 1994),
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this proceeding as provided by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the "all persons present" warrant, pursuant to which

defendant was searched, supported by probable cause?

The trial

court's underlying factual determinations are subject to reversal
only if clearly erroneous, while the trial court's determination
of probable cause is reviewed for correctness, according the
trial court a "measure of discretion."
531, 533 (Utah 1994).

State v. Poole. 871 P.2d

The deference accorded the trial court's

legal determination is a recognition of the multitude of fact

patterns with which a trial court must grapple and which mayconstitute probable cause.

Id. (reviewing the trial court's

factual and legal determinations of probable cause under the same
standards applied to determinations of reasonable suspicion, as
articulated in State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939-40, 939 n.4
(Utah 1994)).
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the warrant

as executed was constitutional?

This issue is analyzed under the

same standard noted in paragraph 1, above.
CONSTITUTIONS PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RPLES
United States Constitution
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place 'to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possessing methamphetamine in a
drug free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) and (5) (Supp. 1994) (Count I), possessing or
using marijuana in a drug free zone, a Class A misdemeanor, in
violation of section 58-37-8(2) (Count II) and unlawfully
possessing drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A
misdemeanor, in violation of sections 58-37a-5 and
58-37-8(5) (R. 6-7). Count II was dismissed at the end of the
preliminary hearing, and defendant was bound over on Counts I and
III, to which he pleaded not guilty (R. 8-10).

Defendant moved

to suppress evidence on the grounds that the search warrant was
unconstitutional (motion and memorandum in support, R. 18, 30-38,
attached at ), which the trial court denied (R. 44-45, 126-63).1
Thereafter, defendant entered a no contest plea to the reduced
charge of possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone
(Count I), a second degree felony, specifically conditioned on
the dismissal of Count III and the reservation of his right to
appeal issues raised in his suppression motion (R. 55-58).

1 Relevant addenda are appended in chronological/procedural
order: affidavit in support of a search warrant (R. 26-29,
Addendum A ) ; search warrant (R. 24-25, Addendum B); transcript of
preliminary hearing (R. 79-124, Addendum C); transcript of
suppression hearing (R. 126-162, Addendum D); and findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order (R. 67-69, Addendum E ) .
3

Defendant was then sentenced to thirty-six months probation (R.
65-66) .
STATEMENT PF THE TACTS
On November 9, 1994, Provo City Police Officer Jerry Harper,
an officer for fifteen years with extensive training and
experience in narcotics investigation, drafted an affidavit in
support of a search warrant (R. 29). The affidavit states that
on September 21, 1994, Provo Police received an anonymous phone
call indicating that the Steven and Angela Hundley, living at 255
N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo, were using and selling cocaine (R. 28).
The caller also indicated that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs
heavily at Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R.
28).

In October, 1994 a confidential informant, known to Officer

Harper to have been previously reliable, corroborated the fact
that Steven Hundley was selling cocaine (R. 28).
On November 7, 1994, Provo City Police officers searched the
Hundley's street-side trash can, finding methamphetamine
paraphernalia with residue, marijuana leaves and stems, syringes,
baggies and butane fuel canisters (R. 28). The amounts of
methamphetamine residue and marijuana implied small amounts for
use (R. 27). Officer Harper stated that such drug paraphernalia
can be "quickly and easily hidden in the clothing or be destroyed
if intent is given to search'' and that controlled substances and
paraphernalia are often kept in outlying vehicles and buildings
(R. 27). He also stated that in his experience persons involved
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with the illegal use of marijuana and methamphetamine generally
sell such substances and that he expected to find additional
controlled substances as well as evidence related to production
and distribution (R. 27). Finally, the affidavit identified the
Hundley's residence as a single-wide mobile home (R. 27).
On November 9, 1994, a warrant based on Officer Harper's
affidavit was issued authorizing the search of the Hundley home
and "any outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any
individuals present at the time of the execution of this warrant"
(R. 24) .
The search warrant was executed on November 11, 1994 (R.
82).

When the officers entered the residence, only Steve and

Angela Hundley and a child were inside (R. 88). Between forty
and seventy-five minutes later, after the Hundley's had been
arrested, defendant arrived in a car driven by Teri Olsen (R. 89,
114-15).

Ms. Olsen parked her car directly behind another

vehicle which was parked in front of the Hundley's trailer (R.
93-94, 111, 142)).

Defendant came to the door and entered the

trailer while the police officers were still inside the residence
completing their search (R. 89-90, 98).
A search of defendant revealed drug paraphernalia which
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 116). Defendant was
placed under arrest, and the vehicle he arrived in was searched
(R. 116). In defendant's jacket investigating officers found
drug paraphernalia including a small butane canister, a pencil-

5

like butane torch and an audio cassette case containing three
baggies of methamphetamine (R. 85, 99, 103). After being advised
of his Miranda rights defendant admitted the paraphernalia and
drugs were his (R. 117-118).
SUMMARY or ARGUMENT

POINT I
Defendant fails to develop with any argument or legal
authority his claim that the warrant lacked particularity as to
"outbuildings, curtilage or persons present," and therefore, the
Court should refuse to consider it on appeal.
The "all persons present" warrant was supported by an
affidavit showing a nexus between criminal activity on the
premises to be searched and any persons at the premises.

The

affadavit stated that occupants of certain premises were dealing
cocaine, that police officers had found methamphetamine and
marijuana residues and associated paraphernalia in the occupants'
street-side trash can only two days before the affidavit was
signed, that the premises were a single-wide trailer, that in the
attesting officer's experience drug users would make sales of
controlled substances which could easily be concealed or
destroyed, and that evidence of controlled substances would
likely be found on persons on the premises.

Considering the

limited size of 1:he premises, the difficulty in specifically
identifying drug users because of the shifting nature of the

6

criminal activity and the ease with which drugs may be concealed
or destroyed, the warrant was constitutionally sufficient.

POINT II
Contrary to defendant's claim, that even if an "all persons
present" warrant is constitutionally valid there must be an
individualized showing of probable cause as to any given person
on specifice premises, Utah law makes clear that it is only
necessary to show a nexus between premises harboring widespread
criminal activity and any person appearing on the premises.
Defendant cites no authority to support his claim that the
warrant was improperly

executed because he was searched

following his arrival on the premises, about an hour after the
police had begun executing the warrant but while they were still
packaging evidence.
The implicit basis of the trial court's ruling sanction the
search of the car, i.e., search incident to arrest, is correct.
Therefore, defendant has no valid claim under the Fourth
Amendment exclusionsary rule to preclude the results of the
search of the car.

7

ABffPMSNT
POINT I
*ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANTS HAVE BEEN
UPHELD IN UTAH UNDER BOTH THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Defendant first argues that the "all persons present" search
warrant issued in this case lacked the particularity required by
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann.
§§ 77-23-201, 203 (1995),2 because it "[did not] to give a
particularized description of the 'outbuildings, curtilage,
vehicles or persons present' that are also subject to the
2

Defendant contends that this Court should give article I,
section
14 of the Utah Constitution a more expansive reading than
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Appellant's Br. at 10. However, because defendant wmerely relies
upon general statements that Utah has a unique history and cites to
cases from other contexts where the Utah Constitution has been
interpreted differently from the United States Constitution, this
Court should not engage in an independent state constitutional
analysis under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah App. 1994).
Furthermore, because defendant has only nominally referenced
article I, section 14 in his memorandum in support of his motion to
supress,
and only in parallel with the Fourth Amendment (R. 31-36),
and did not mention a state constitutional basis for his claims at
the suppression hearing (R. 126-63), this Court should find that
the issue has not been preserved or appeal. State v. Gibbons. 74 0
P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (a reviewing court ordinarily "will not
entertain an issue first raised on appeal in the absence of
exceptional circumstances or plain error"); State v. Price. 837
P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah App. 1992). See alfifi State v. Sterger. 808
P.2d 122, 124 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to consider a state
constitutional argument which had only been nominally alluded to in
the trial court, citing State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d -1268, 1269 (Utah
App. 1990). The same argument applies with greater force to
defendant's reference to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2-201, 203 (1995),
which defendant never mentioned in the trial court.
8

search."

Appellant's Br. at 10-11.

Secondarily, defendant

argues that the "all persons present" warrant was defective as
such, citing in support precisely those cases relied on in State
v. Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep 22, 23-24 (Utah App. 1995),
wherein this Court found valid "all persons present" warrants in
appropriate circumstances. Appellant's Br. at Point I, 11-15.
However, all cases cited by defendant, including Covington, rely
on the "nexus" test, which requires that an "all persons present"
warrant is supported by probable cause if the supporting
affidavit shows there is a sufficient connection between the
criminal activity, the place of the activity and the persons at
the place. £££ State v. Hinkel. 365 N.W.2d 774, 775-76 (Minn.
1985); State v. De Simone. 288 A.2d 849, 850-51 (N.J. 1972);
State v. Anderson. 415 N.W.2d 57, 58-60 (Minn. App. 1987);
Commonwealth v. Smith. 348 N.E.2d 101, 105-06 (Mass. 1976), cert,
denied. 492 U.S. 944 (1976). Because defendant fails to
adequately argue his first point on appeal, and because this case
falls within those circumstances described in Covington and its
supporting authority, defendant's challenge to the trial court's
conclusions are without merit.
A.

Standard of Review

Defendant argues that this Court should correct the trial
court's legal conclusion that Mt]he authority granting paragraph
in the warrant in its totality is neither too broad or vague,"
Appellant's Br. at 15, thereby suggesting that the validity of
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the warrant is subject to de novo review for correctness.
Appellant's Br. at 2.

However, defendant ultimately argues the

insufficiency of the magistrate's probable cause determination
based on the affidavit.

Appellant's Br. at 14-15.

It is the

State's contention that the same standard of deferential review
employed by the trial court in considering the magistrate's
determination of probable cause should be applied by this Court
to the trial court's implicit conclusion that the warrant was
based on probable cause.

See also Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 25 (analyzing precisely the same issue in terms of whether
probable cause had been established by the affidavit).
"A trial court does not conduct a de novo review in
determining if there is probable cause to support the issuance of
a search warrant, Illinois V, Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987,
991 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller. 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah App.
1987), but rather must 'pay great deference to the magistrate's
decision.' Babbell. 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting £&£££, 462 U.S. at
238-39)."

State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284, (Utah App. 1990).

The

probable cause standard requires "'only the probability, and not
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.'" Id. (Citing Gates.
462 U.S. at 235). "Accordingly, the magistrate must consider all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit and make a
'practical, common-sense decision whether . . . there is a fair
probability' that criminal evidence will be found in the
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described place.

Gates. 462 U.S. at 238; £££ Bflkkell/ 770 P.2d

at 991; State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d [1203,] 1205 [(Utah 1984)];
State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)."
Id.
B.

Defendant's "Particularity" Challenge Fails
for Lack of Legal Argument or Authority

Defendant argues that the authority-granting paragraph is
constitutionally deficient because it * [did not] give a
particularized description of the 'outbuildings, curtilage,
vehicles or persons present' that are also subject to the
search."

However, defendant on appeal entirely fails to develop

with argument or legal authority that these terms are
constitutionally deficient.

Therefore, the Court should decline

to consider the argument on appeal.

See State v. Amicone. 689

P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on issue
unsupported by any argument or legal authority).

Therefore, this

Court should decline to consider defendant's claim that the
authority-granting clause of the warrant lacked particularity.
C.

Under Covington, the Affidavit Supplied
Probable Cause Justifying the Issuance
of an "All Persons Present" Warrant

In Covington, this Court recognized that " [a]s a general
rule • . . %open-ended or general warrants are constitutionally
prohibited."'

ggvingtOfl/ 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23 (citing Ybarra

v. Illinois. 44 U.S. 85, 92 n.4# 100 S. Ct. 338, 342 n.4
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(1979)).3

Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the validity of an

u

all persons present" search warrant because the affidavit in

that case established probable cause that everyone present at the
premises at the time of the search would be engaged in illegal
conduct.

Id. at 22-25 (citing State v. De Simone. 288 A.2d 849,

850 (N.J. 1972), for the proposition that ^[If] there is good
reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the
anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence
becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the [specificity
requirement] of the Fourth Amendment").
This court then went on to cite numerous examples of search
warrants which were upheld because the facts established wa
sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the place of the
activity, and the persons at the place."

Id. at 22. The Court

announced three factors it considered particularly relevant in

3

Defendant inappropriately cites Ybarra and State v.
Jackson. 873 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1994), in his challenge to the
validity of the warrant.
In Ybarra, the challenged warrant
authorized only the search of a bar and the barkeeper. Ybarra. 444
U.S. at 88. In Jackson, the warrant authorized a search of "all
persons living in the residence."
Jackson. 873 P.2d at 1166.
Thus, neither Ybarra nor Jackson, were cases dealing with "all
persons present" warrants. Moreover, both Covington and authority
on which it relied noted that Ybarra expressly contemplated the
possibility that in other circumstances wall persons present"
warrants were constitutionally valid if supported by probable cause
that unnamed persons on the premises would possess contraband. See
Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25 n.l; People v. Johnson. 805
P.2d 1156, 1159 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (cited by Covington. 274 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 24) . S&S. also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 4.5(e), 231 n. 114 (2nd ed. 1987) (same).
12

assessing the underlying affidavit for probable cause to search
all persons present:
[1] the premises or area to be searched are
small, confined and private [as opposed to a
public or guasi\public place where casual
presence of persons for myriad of noncriminal
reasons is to be expected]; [2] the nature of
the criminal activity is such that the
participants (in general) constantly shift or
change so that it is, practically, impossible
for the police to predict that any specific
person or persons will be on the premises at
any given time; and [3] the items
specifically described in the warrant as the
target of the search are of a size or kind
which renders them easily and likely to be
concealed on the person.
Id. at 24 (citing Smith. 348 N.E.2d at 105-06).
Applying these tests the Court found that the affidavit
established probable cause to search Covington, who was found
just outside a basement apartment from which drugs were being
sold.

Particularly, the affidavit stated that a woman, arrested

with methamphetamine on her person, told police that she had
stolen the drugs from her supplier, a man known to have a
substantial history of involvement with controlled substances and
who had bindles ready for sale; that she had smoked
methamphetamine with her supplier that day at his residence; that
the supplier resided in a basement apartment at a specified
address; that law enforcement had received tips from a number of
sources that the supplier had been selling methamphetamine during
the year and within the preceding three weeks; and that based on
attesting officer's experience, persons on the premises would
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likely have in their possession small bindles of drugs which
could easily be hidden or destroyed.

Id. at 24-25.

While the affidavit in this case does not reference the
extended criminal activity evident in Covington, it nonetheless
provides probable cause to believe that individuals present at
the time of execution of the warrant would be involved in
narcotics offenses:

The affidavit states that on September 21,

1994, about six weeks before the warrant was sought on November
9, 1994, Provo Police received an anonymous phone call indicating
that the Steven and Angela Hundley, living at 255 N. 1600 W. #121
in Provo, were using and selling cocaine (R. 28); that the caller
also indicated that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs heavily at
Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R. 28); that in
October, 1994 a confidential informant, known to Officer Harper,
the attesting officer, to have been previously reliable,
corroborated the fact that Steven Hundley was selling cocaine (R.
28); that on November 7, 1994, two days before the warrant
issued, Provo City Police officers searched the Hundley's trash
can, finding methamphetamine paraphernalia with residue,
marijuana leaves and stems, syringes, baggies and butane fuel
canisters (R. 28); that the amounts of methamphetamine residue
and marijuana implied small amounts for use (R. 27); that such
drug paraphernalia can be nquickly and easily hidden in the
clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to search" and that
controlled substances and paraphernalia are often kept in
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outlying vehicles and buildings (R. 27); that in the attesting
officer's experience persons involved with the illegal use of
marijuana and methamphetamine generally sell such substances and
that he expected to find additional controlled substances as well
as evidence related to production and distribution (R. 27); and
that the Hundley's residence was a single-wide mobile home
located at the address mentioned by the anonymous caller (R. 27).
Following the criteria set out in Smith, the affidavit
identifies a sufficient nexus between the Hundley's criminal
activity, their residence, and defendant, who appeared on the
premises at the time of the search.

First, the single-wide

trailer is precisely the "small, confined and private" place
which by its physical limitation gives notice to anyone on the
premises of whatever activity is on-going, as distinguished from
a large public place where people may reasonably gather for a
variety of purposes without being aware of any clandestine
criminal activity.

See De Simone, 288 A.2d at 850

(distinguishing the notice of illegal activity given by a dice
game in a barn, as opposed to a sale of lottery slips in a
department store or an industrial plant).

Apparently defendant

was no stranger to the premises, since he appears to have
entered the trailer of his own accord without formality (R. 116).
Secondly, drug dealing is by its nature an activity in which the
participants are constantly shifting, so that it is impossible to
know which buyer will be on the premises at any given time.
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Thirdly, the affidavit specifically states that small amounts of
methamphetamine residue and marijuana were located in the garbage
can, that such substances could be packaged in 1/8 ounce baggies
or bindles and that they could be easily and quickly destroyed or
concealed if a search were imminent.

The affidavit identified

substantial evidence that drugs were being sold from the trailer,
based on evidence that Steven Hundley was dealing cocaine heavily
at his place of employment, that both he and his wife were using
and selling cocaine, and that residue of controlled substances
and baggies, clear evidence of on-going distribution, were found
in the garbage can only two days before the warrant issued.
Finally, as a basis for the "all persons present" warrant, the
attesting officer, with fifteen years of experience, stated that
since in his experience sales would be made from the premises,
persons on the premises would likely conceal or destroy

the

contraband.
The trial court concluded that the authority-granting
paragraph of the warrant was neither vague nor overbroad and that
the magistrate had the constitutional right to issue a warrant
"which calls for the search of . . . the persons of any
individuals present at the time of the execution of the warrant"
(R. 68). Given that the magistrate need find only a "fair
probability" from the affidavit and surrounding circumstances
that evidence of illegal conduct will be found on the premises to
be searched, this Court should find under the standards set out
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in Covington that the trial court properly held the warrant
constitutional.

POINT II
THE WARRANT WAS EXECUTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
In his final point defendant asserts that even if a "general
warrant," i.e., an "all persons present" warrant meets
constitutional requirements, an unreasonable search may result if
it is executed beyond the scope of its authorization.
Particularly, defendant claims that he was searched after the
time in which the warrant was being executed.
16-17.

Appellant's Br. at

Thereafter, defendant cites authority requiring

independent probable cause to search an individual,
notwithstanding the issuance of a valid warrant.

Appellant's Br.

at 18. He concludes by arguing that because there was no
independent probable cause justifying his search on the premises,
any evidence found as a result of the alleged impermissible
search must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
Appellant's Br. at 18-19.

The argument seriously misapprehends

the applicable legal standards.
Pe Simons, upon which Covington and all of its cited
authority rely, makes plain that the independent probable cause
which establishes with particularity that any given individual on
certain premises will likely be involved in criminal activity is
not established by specifically identifying the defendant in the
affidavit.

Rather, it is any defendant's connection to the
17

patent criminal activity on given premises that establishes
probable cause--"presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying
the aim of the Fourth Amendment."

De Simone. 288 A.2d at 850.

In spite of his relying on authority that find sufficient
probable cause as to any given person in the unique circumstances
supporting a valid "all persons present" warrant, without any
further particularized showing as to a given defendant, defendant
fails to appreciate the distinction made in those cases. See
Appellant's Br. at 14-16, 18. Not surprisingly, no authority
cited by defendant concerns "all persons present" warrants, but
rather warrants whose proper execution would require a showing of
individualized probable cause.

See Jackson, 873 P.2d at 1166

(warrant authorizing search of uall persons living in the
residence"); State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1986) (noknock warrant to search residence, evidently without authority to
search all persons present); Knight v, State, 566 So.2d 8, 8
(Fla. App. 1990) (warrant authorizing search of premises and of
"all persons therein who shall be participating in said criminal
activity").

Therefore, none of such authority is relevant to the

resolution of the issues on appeal.
Defendant contends that because he appeared on the scene
between forty and seventy-five minutes after the police had begun
executing the warrant, and after the Hundleys were arrested, they
and their child transported and the video cameras put away, that
he was not on the premises at the time of the execution of the
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warrant.

Appellant's Br. at 17. However, the only authority

that defendant cites seems rather to support the contrary
position.

See Knight. 566 So.2d at 8-9 (noting that although the

"search was almost complete," the "warrant was being executed").
Moreover, common sense dictates that while the police are still
on premises pursuant to the warrant, the warrant is being
executed.

In this case the record shows that evidence was still

being packed up when defendant arrived (R. 90-92).

The trial

court held that the execution of the warrant only terminates when
the officers leave, until which time the officers had authority,
under the warrant, to search a person entering the property (R.
68).

Nothing in defendant's argument or the record suggests that

this conclusion was incorrect.
Finally, defendant challenges the search of the car as fruit
of the poisonous tree resulting from the alleged unconstitutional
search of his person.

In this case defendant entered the

Hundley's trailer, was searched, arrested and then handcuffed,
after which the car was searched (R. 115-16).
found defendant's jacket

In the car police

containing methamphetamine and

paraphernalia (R. 85, 99, 103), which form the basis of the
charge to which defendant pleaded guilty (R. 57).
In its written conclusions the trial court held that *[t]he
fact that defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person gives
the police the right to search that vehicle to make a
determination if there are any further drugs" (R. 68). At the
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hearing the trial court had also stated that "[o]nce
[defendant's] placed under arrest [the police] certainly have the
right to [search that vehicle to make a determination if there is
[sic] any further drugs]" (R. 156).
It is evident that the trial court considered the ensuing
search of the car a lawful search incident to an arrest.
Defendant nowhere challenges this theory in the trial court,
which is undoubtedly correct in the circumstances.

See State v.

Kent. 665 P.2d 1317, 1317-18 (Utah 1983) (upholding search
incident to arrest where defendant was arrested and detained in
the presence of ten police officers); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d
769, 783-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (1991)
(upholding search of a diaper bag containing a gun incident to
arrest of a homicide suspect).

Further, the initial search was

constitutionally sound, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
does not apply.

Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial

court's ruling that the police had the authority to search the
car following defendant's arrest.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
Given the fact sensitivity of determinations of probable
cause generally and the lack of Utah cases dealing with the
application of Covington in determining probable cause in
particular, the State believes that this Court's decision-making
process would be aided by oral argument and that .the publishing
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of a full written opinion in this case would be useful in
developing this area of the law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress and judgment of conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?4

day of November, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
^<ju«r>*-^^<--erx-<

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAIMNO
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Margaret P. Lindsay and Michael E. Jewell, Utah County Public
Defenders Assoc, attorneys for defendant, 40 South 100 West,
Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, this -7^
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day of November, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

KAY BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH
PHONE: (801) 370-8026
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
A SEARCH WARRANT

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Criminal No,

STFVFN HTTNni.FY

ANGELA HUNDLEY
755 N. 16TDTr-Wr-^121
PROVO, UT
Defendants
STATE OF UTAH
:ss,
COUNTY OF UTAH

)

Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes
and states as follows:
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes I
have taken include training in surveillance, operation of
surveillance and electronic investigatory equipment, field testing
of drugs and drug recognition. As an officer I have participated
in hundreds of operations involving the undercover purchase of
narcotics and/or the arrest of person for substance abuse related
violations. I have experience working undercover' providing first
hand experience with narcotics trafficking.
I have supervised
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since
1992.
I
am
currently
designated
as
the
department
trainer/specialist in the areas of fingerprinting, surveillance,
video equipment, narcotics and drug recognition.
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2.
On Sept. 21, 1994 Lt. Dave Bolda of the Provo City Police
Department received an anonymous phone call that Defendants are
using and selling cocaine.
The caller indicated Defendants1
address as being 255 N. 1600 W. #121, Provo, Utah, Utah County,
The anonymous caller also indicated that Defendant Steven Hundley
is dealing heavily at his place of employment, that being Mountain
States Steel.
3.
That during the month of October, 1994 Officer Jensen of
the Provo City Police Department received information from a
Confidential Informant that Defendant Steven Hundley is selling
cocaine.
4.
Your affiant believes the Confidential Informant who
spoke to Officer Jensen to be reliable in that the Confidential
Informant has supplied law enforcement with information in the past
that has proven reliable.
5.
Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each
home is assigned a specific can which is owned by the City. An
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee. Once per
week, the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for
collection. A City truck then mechanically picks up and empties
the can.
6.
That on Nov. 7, 1994 in the early morning hours, your
affiant and other officers responded to the residence located at
255 N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo. There was one can placed in the
street for collection at that location with the numeral "121"
stencilled on the side. Your affiant took the can to the Provo
Police Department where the contents were reviewed. After your
affiant finished, the remaining contents were placed in the can and
the can returned to the street in front of the residence at 255 N.
1600 W. #121.
7.
Within the can, officers found paraphernalia associated
with the ingestion of methamphetamine. A chemical reagent test was
used on a piece of paraphernalia, that being a piece of charred
glass, which showed positive for methamphetamine. Also found in
the garbage were marijuana stems and leaf fragments. A chemical
reagent test was used on a leaf fragment which showed positive for
marijuana.
Other parts of paraphernalia found were syringes,
baggies, and butane fuel canisters. Also found in the garbage was
correspondence listing the address 255 N. 1600 W. #121 and also
listing the names Steven Hundley and Angie Hundley.

if"
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8.
The amounts of residue and marijuana in the garbage
imply small amounts for use.
Such amounts of marijuana and
methamphetamine are typically packaged in baggies of 1/8 oz. or
less for marijuana, and one gram bindles for methamphetamine, quite
small in volume. Such baggies and bindles can quickly and easily
be hidden in the clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to
search. Moreover, it is your affiant's experience that persons
with a potentially violent disposition may react with violence if
confronted with a search.
One of the side effects of
methamphetamine use is an increase in violent behavior. Entry
without notice allows officers to secure the residence and secure
officer safety.
9.
Marijuana, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia are often
kept in outlying vehicles and buildings. Failure to search the
curtilage of the residence, together with the person of individuals
present, and vehicles located on the curtilage at the time of the
execution of the search, will likely result in officers missing
important evidence.
10. It is your affiant's experience that most of the people
I
have
encountered
with
the
unlawful
use
of
marijuana/methamphetamine also occasionally sell, sometimes paying
for their use with profits from sales. It is so common as to be
the rule rather than the exception, to find evidence related to
production and/or distribution when controlled substances are
located in a residence.
11. The residence is more particularly described as a singlewide mobile home located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The
mobile home is in the south end of the mobile park located on a
corner, that corner being a south west corner. The mobile home is
cream colored with brown trim with the main entrance facing south.
The numerals "121" are located on the east side and the south side
of the mobile home.
12. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled
substances
in
the
residence, together
with
associated
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and
methamphetamine.

Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by
this court authorizing the search of the mobile home, together with
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together
with associated paraphernalia including items used or capable of
being used for the storage, use, production or distribution of
controlled substances to be executed without notice of intent or
authority in the daytime.
Dated this

Of &
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day of Oofeobar 1994 A.M.

A

per
cial Investigations

Subscribed and sworn before me on the
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1994,
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ADDENDUM B

KAY BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH 84601
PHONE: (801) 370-8026
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN
ANGELA
255 N.
PROVO,

HUNDLEY
HUNDLEY
1600 W. #121
UT

:

SEARCH WARRANT

:

Criminal No.

Defendants
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Magistrates
Endorsement

1.
^

It has been established by oath or
affirmation made or submitted to me this
/ day of November, 1994 that there is
probable cause to believe the following:
The property described below:

>

was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed;
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of
an offense; or
is evidence of illegal conduct.

4&

2.

The property described below is most probably
located at the premises also set forth below.

3.

The person or entity in possession of the property
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct.

4.

That this warrant may be served without notice of
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that
the property to be searched for may be easily 2 5
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of
intent to search is given.
f* ^ P O V E R Y C ^ N
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That this warrant may be served in the day time
hours.

NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to conduct
a search of the a residence described as a single-wide mobile home
located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The mobile home is in the
south end of the mobile park located on a corner, that corner being
a south west corner. The mobile home is cream colored with brown
trim with the main entrance facing south. The numerals "121" are
located on the east side and the south side of the mobile home.
Your are also hereby directed to search of any outbuildings,
curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present at
the time of the execution of this warrant.
You are directed to search for the presence
property: controlled
substances, together
paraphernalia, including items used or capable
the storage, use, production, or distribution
methamphetamine.

of the following
with associated
of being used for
of marijuana and

IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place
where the property is being held.

THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE
OF ISSUANCE.
DATED this

j

day of November, 1994,

MAGISTRATE
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STATE OF UTAH,

^ n ^ r Oriairia
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 941-1347

<?4/</oo V°i

SHANE DOYLE,
Defendant•

Preliminary Hearing
Electronically recorded on
December 15, 1994
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH I, DIMICK
Fourth Circuit Court Judge
APPEARANCES:
For the State:

For the Defendant:

Craia Madsen
Deputy County Attorney
100 East Center Street
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)370-8 026
Michael Jewell
Utah County Public Defender
40 South 100 West
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801)379-2570

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
CENTER COURT REPORTING
P. O. BOX 1786
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786
TELEPHONE: (801)224-9847
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on December 15, 1994)
THE COURT: Let's move on to State versus
Shane Doyle,

Is the defense ready?

MR. JEWELL: We are, your Honor.
THE COURT: Is the State?
MR. MADSEN: Yes, we are.
THE COURT: Anything preliminary?
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I think that we'd
ask the Court to invoke the exclusionary rule at
this time.
THE COURT: Would you call your witnesses,
please.
MR. MADSEN: Devon Jensen, Russ Billings,
Denton Johnston, Shawn Adamson.

I believe that's

all.
THE COURT: Who are you going to call
first?
MR. MADSEN: Denton Johnston.
THE COURT: Do you want anybody for
assistance?
MR. MADSEN: When he's finished I'll have
him remain.
THE COURT: I want to ask the other three
of you to stay out of earshot and not to discuss

•~-0
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the case while you're out.

Thank you.

MR. MADSEN: State calls Denton Johnston.
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that
the testimony you're about to give in the case now
pending before this Court will be the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
THE WITNESS: I do.
MR. MADSEN: Can I question him seated
(inaudible).
THE COURT: Sure.
DENTON JOHNSTON,
having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MADSEN:
Q.

Will you please state your full name and

your occupation.
A.

My name is Denton Johnston.

I'm a police

sergeant for the City of Orem.
Q,

Did you assist in the execution of a

search warrant on the 11th day of November of this
year at approximately 5 o'clock

(inaudible)?

A.

I did.

Q.

Where did that take place?
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A.

It took place at 255 North 1600 West in

Provo at trailer No. 121.
THE COURT: Say again.
THE WITNESS: It was at 255 North 1600
West, trailer No. 121 in Provo.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Q.

BY MR. MADSEN: Did your warrant include

vehicles of individuals present during the
execution of the warrant?
A.

Yes, it did.
MR. JEWELL: Objection, your Honor.

have the warrant present

Did he

(inaudible).

THE COURT: I didn't hear the question.
MR. MADSEN: The warrant provided for the
search of the vehicles of any individuals present
during the execution of the warrant.
THE COURT: And your objection.
MR. JEWELL: My objection it's hearsay.
The warrant speaks for itself.
THE COURT: Well, at a hearing where the
content of the warrant could be suppressed and
where the results received from it could be
suppressed I think that's a pretty good motion.
For preliminary hearing I think it's a short forum
that it's okay.

Your answer.

W

W
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THE WITNESS: M ay he repeat the question.
BY MR. MADSEN: Yes.

Q.

Did the warrant

3

provide for the search of the vehicles of the

4

individuals present dur ing the execution of the

5

warrant

6

A.

Yes, it did.

7

Q.

And didn't in fact a vehicle arrive during

8

•>

the execution of the va rrant?

9

A.

Yes, it did.

10

Q.

Who was the op erator of the vehicle?

11

A.

A young lady n amed Teri Olsen.

12

Q.

Who was presen t with Teri Olsen?

13

A.

There was the defendant Shane Doyle,

14

There was also a 12-yea r-old girl I don't have the

15

name of who they had br ought over to babysit two

16

smaller children that w ere also in the car.

17
18

Q.

Was any proper ty removed from that

vehicle*?

19

A.

During the sea rch or what?

20

Q.

During the sea rch of the vehicle.

21

A.

Yes, there was

22

jacket.

23

Q.

24
25

There was a brown leather

Did you person ally examine the contents of

the jacket?
A.

Yes, I did.

•C;wJ
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Q.

What was inside the jacket?

A.

Inside the jacket there was what I

determined to be drug paraphernalia*
small butane canister.

There was a

Along with the butane

canister there was a small pencil-like butane
torch.

There was also a cassette tape that at that

time I passed over.

There was a -- I believe that

was all the paraphernalia that I located within the
jacket.
Q.

Were you able to determine to whom the

jacket belonged?
A.

Yes, there was also a note inside the

jacket addressed to Shane.

I questioned Ms. Olsen

about whose jacket it was.

She said that it was

Shane Doyle's.
Q.

Now, is the person you're identifying as

Shane Doyle, is he present here in the courtroom?
A.

Yes, he is.

Q,

Where is he?

A.

He's at the defendant's table.

Q.

To your knowledge was there any other

property removed from the vehicle, particularly the
passenger's side?
A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

Who was driving the vehicle?

•0^0
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A.

Ms. Olsen, Teri Olsen.

Q.

On the passenger's side what else did you

locate?
A.

There was a package of cigarettes or a

cigarette pack itself.

I don't recall if there was

actually cigarettes in it.

There was a marijuana

pipe found inside it.
Q.

Any marijuana inside the bag?

A.

I don't recall if there was any marijuana

in there.
MR. MADSEN: That's all the questions, your
Honor.
CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. JEWELL:
Q.

Officer Johnston, who went with you to

execute the warrant?
A.

There was my myself, Sergeant Jerry

Harper, Officer Russ Billings, Officer Devon
Jensen, Shawn Adamson.

There was two uniforms from

Provo City who I don't recall their names.
Q.

Now, did this group of people that you

just named, did you all go over together to execute
the warrant?
A.

Yes, we did.

Q.

How was this accomplished?

Did someone

•Jv j
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knock on the door?

How did you give notice that a

warrant was to be executed?
A,

We pulled up in a van.

We were all

loaded in a van and pulled up to the front door.
Detective Shawn Adamson and Detective Andre Leavitt
-- who I just recall was with us also -- went to
the door, knocked on the door.
Once the door was opened they gave us a
visual signal.

At that time we opened the door to

the van and rushed in and did the cursory search
and secured the trailer house.
Q.

Okay.

Now, at what time did the van pull

up to the house?
A.

I don't recall the exact time.
THE COURT: After you arrived?
THE WITNESS: Pardon me?
THE COURT: After you arrived?
THE WITNESS: The van?
MR. JEWELL: Oh, I'm sorry.

No, I'm

talking about the van the officers were in
(inaudible).
THE COURT: Okay.
Q.

BY MR. JEWELL: What time did you guys, you

the officers pull up to the house?
A.

I don't recall the times.

It was

•OuO
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approximately 1700, 5 o'clock in the evening.
Q.

Okay, and when you rushed into the house

-- after you'd been given the signal and you rushed
into the house, who was present inside the house?
A.

It was Steve Hundley and his wife Angie

Hundley.
Q.

Was there anyone else present besides

Mr. and Mrs. Hundley?
A.

I believe there was a small child there.

Q.

No other adults present; is that right?

A.

No, there was no other adults present at

that time.
Q.

At that time did you begin searching the

A.

My primary responsibility once the trailer

home?

was secured was to videotape the suspects that we
were going to arrest and videotape any evidence.
As far as searching, I didn't participate in any of
the searching of the trailer.
Q.

Was the warrant itself actually handed to

one of the two adult Hundleys at that time?
A.
hand.

I don't recall who had the warrant in
I believe Sergeant Jerry Harper was the

affiant.

He was responsible to actually physically

take the warrant inside the house and give it to
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the occupants.

I didn't do it.

THE COURT: Is that something you taped?
THE WITNESS: Pardon me?
THE COURT: Is that something you videoed?
THE WITNESS: No, it was not.
Q.

BY MR. JEWELL: Now, after you entered into

the home after being given the visual signal, how
much time elapsed between that and when the
automobile driven by Ms. Olsen arrived?
A.
minutes.

It was probably an hour, an hour and 15
We were almost concluded with the search

of the trailer when Mr. Doyle and Ms. Olsen
arrived.
Q.

So you believe an hour, an hour and 15

minutes would be about how much time elapsed
between your entry into the trailer and when the
car with Ms. Olsen and Mr. Doyle arrived; is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q*

Okay.

Do you have a copy of your report

in front of you?
A*

Yes,

Q.

Okay.

I

do.
Now, at the time when you wrote

this report how much time after you went on this
search warrant did you write up this report?
r

>
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A.

It was probably the next day.

Q.

So would you term what you wrote on the

14th fairly accurate, pretty close in time?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

I'd like to draw your attention to

paragraph two of that report, the first sentence.
No, third paragraph, I'm sorry.
sentence.
A.

The first

Could you read that for us, please.
At the completion of the search warrant

two other individuals arrived at the home.

A Shane

Doyle and a Teri Olsen arrived.
Q.

Would you say that's accurate?

A.

Well, as I stated before, we were almost

completed with the warrant.

We were getting the

evidence packed up and getting ready to leave.
Making arrangements for having someone to pick up
the child because we were taking Mr. and Mrs.
Hundley into custody.
Q.

Had they already been arrested and removed

from the home at that point?
A.

Okay.

I don't recall if they had been

transported yet or not.

They had been placed under

arrest at that time -- by that time, yes.
Q.

But you're not sure whether or not they

had actually been removed from the home at this

'JsJ J
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point, right?
A.

Right.

I don't know if the uniforms had

taken them and transported them or not.
Q.

Did you videotape the arrival of this

automobile driven by Ms. Olsen?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Did you at any point videotape either

Ms. Olsen or Mr. Doyle?
A.

I don't believe I did.

I don't believe

Q.

Had you already put away the video camera

so.

by that point?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Had any of the officers left the scene by

the time that Mr. Doyle and Ms. Olsen arrived?
A*
any.

No, not that I know of.

We had two vehicles.

I don't recall

There was Sergeant

Blackhurst's Blazer and a van.

Those officers that

came in the van were all still there.

I don't

recall if Sergeant Blackhurst had left by then or
not.
Q.

Had any of the evidence been removed from

the scene at the time they arrived?
A.

No, it hadn't.

No, it had not.

Q.

And as far as the child, had the child

:.o
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been removed at that point?
A.

No, it had not.

Q.

Okay.

Could I have you come up here, if

you wouldn't mind, to the board and just diagram
the trailer, where your van was parked and where
the automobile arrived.
THE COURT: You can tell us what you're
drawing as you're doing it.
THE WITNESS: Okay.

This is inside the

Lamplighter -- I believe it's called the Lamp -- or
commonly known as the Lamplighter Trailer Park.

I

don't know the exact street designations for these
two streets.
The Lamplighter, itself, that trailer park
is the address 255 North 1600 West.
trailer No. 121.
access.

It's just

It sits on the east/west type

This road, I believe, comes down into a

culdesac with additional trailers sitting on it.
We came in here.
parked his Blazer here.

Sergeant Blackhurst
We drove the van around

here and stopped and waited.

Detective Leavitt,

Detective Adamson was the passenger and the driver
of the vehicle.

The rest of us were in the back of

the van.
Ms. Olsen and Mr. Doyle pulled up in a

r^
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L

white Ford Escort parked in front of this other

l\

trailer right here.

1

south of the

i

Q-

So they were parked to the

van.

BY MR. JEWELL: Okay.

Could you indicate

J which entrance was used by the officers who went in
> to knock on the door.
This entrance here. This entrance here
A
1
*
M was kind of a -- I don't recall if it was bolted or
u

locked sihut.

i

Q.

It wasn't a functional entrance.

So that entrance you've just indicated,

that one that would be on the south end of the
trailer, that was the entrance used by all
officers'p
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, as far as any fencing or markings, is

there any fencing around that particular trailer to
indicate that this is the property owned by that
trailer?
A*

I don't recall if there was a fence here .

I know there's not a fence here.
of 121 there's not a fence
Q*

On the south side

(inaudible).

Now, as far as the —

you've marked the

Escort as being directly in front of the trailer,
just to the south of the Hundley Residence.

1

A.

That's what I said, yes.

Right.

'J C* \j
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Q.

And which way was it facing?

A.

It was facing south, like that.

Our

vehicle was also facing south.
Q.

Are there markings on the curbs for which

trailer is which, or are the markings actually on
the trailers themselves?
A.

The markings are on the trailers

themselves.

There are no markings on the road

surface to designate an address or anything like
that.

It's just a -- you know, it's a smooth road,

is all that is there.
Q.

Now, as far as mailboxes, are the

mailboxes on the trailers or are they in front of
the trailers?
A.

I don't recall where the mailboxes are at,

or even if -- I don't know if this trailer has a
common area for mail to walk down to, or whether
the mail is delivered directly to the trailers
themselves•
Q.

Now, what about the actual parking for the

owners or tenants of the trailer?

Do they park

next to the trailer or do they have to park up the
street also?
h.

They can park in -- there's a pad between

each of the trailers where the occupants or the

0-3
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tenants can park their vehicles.
Q.

So the pad for the Hundley trailer would

be just south?
A.

Yeah, it's right here.

I guess it would

be to th e south.
Q.

The southeast of the trailer?

A.

Southeast•

Q.

Okay, and then just south of that would be

the neighbor's trailer?
A.

Yes, this is another trailer here.

Q.

And that would be -- was that No. 122?

A.

I don't recall what it is.

Whether it was

122 or - - trailer parks have a tendency to have
their own pattern when they set it up.
Q.

And then the pad for the neighbor' s

trailer is just the south of that trailer a ISO?
A.

Yeah, this pad would go to this trailer,

this pad would go to this trailer.

It was very

limited space (inaudible) between the trail er and
the curb on the north side.
Q.

How much space between the trailer and the

curb on the east side?
A.

Eight to ten feet.

Q-

Now, that street that's in front, is that

a common area street?
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A,

This right here?

Q.

Uh-huh.

A.

Yeah, it's an access street because you

have trailers back here.
Q.

And how many trailers would you estimate

are in that area?
A.

One, two, three, four, five, six.

There

would probably be seven trailers in this including
(inaudible).
Q.
area?

And were there street lights over that
Was it in the day or night?

A.

I'm

sorry.

We entered during the daylight hours.

(inaudible) when it was dark.

We

I recall there was a

street light over here, and I recall that there
possibly was a street light down here at the end of
the culdesac that was lit when we left.

This area

by the trailer itself was quite dark.
Q.

Were there other cars parked along the

street at that time that the Doyle pulled up?
A.

I recall another car sitting in front of

the Ford Escort.

There was another vehicle or

something there, a trailer of some sort parked in
the street.
Q.

And that was parked -- was that there when

the Escort pulled up?

The Escort pulled up behind

OoO
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that; is that what you're saying?
A,

No.

What I'm saying is it was there when

I came out and searched the vehicle,
Q.

Is that right?

A.

There was another vehicle or a trailer.

There was something there in front of the Escort.
Q.

Was that vehicle searched?

A.

No, it was not.

Q.

Do you know who the owner of that vehicle

A.

I do not.

was?

MR. JEWELL: I don't believe I have any
further questions, your Honor.
MR. MADSEN: No more questions, your Honor.
The State calls Devon Jensen.
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that
the testimony you are about to give in the case now
pending before this Court will be the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
DEVON JENSEN.
having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
DIRECT

EXAMINATION

C^O
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BY MR. MADSEN:
Q.

Would you please state your full name and

occupation.
A.

Devon Jensen.

I'm a police officer for

Provo City.
Q,

Now, did you participate in the search of

the Hundley's trailer on the 11th day of November
of this year?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Pursuant to that were you there when a

vehicle arrived operated by Ms. Olsen in which
Mr. Shane Doyle was a passenger?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

When did you first see Ms. Olsen and

Mr. Doyle?
A.

When they came to the door while we were

executing a search warrant inside.
Q.

Subsequent to that contact did you have

occasion to examine the contents of the jacket that
was described as Mr. Doyle's?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Did you ever examine any of the items that

were removed from it?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you remember seeing a cassette case

*/ w \J
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either in the vehicle or outside the trailer?
A.

Yes, I found a cassette case on the

passenger floor of the vehicle.
Q.

Do you know who put it there?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

Did you examine the cassette case?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you examine the contents?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was inside?

A.

Three plastic bags which contained

methamphetamine.
Q.

Were they field tested?

A.

Yes, they were.

Q.

Tested positive?

A.

Yes, they were.
MR. MADSEN: I have no other questions,

your Honor.
THE COURT: Would you describe the location
of the cassette case as you found it.
THE WITNESS: It was on the passenger floor
of the vehicle.

It was a Ford Escort.

THE COURT: You looked there after this
vehicle had been entered by others or were you
looking?
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THE WITNESS: Detective Johnston and
Adamson had already been looking through the
vehicle when I went and looked and found the
cassette.
THE COURT: Had they discontinued their
search when you began yours?
THE WITNESS: I believe they were still
searching and interviewing the female at the time
when I went out and assisted them in searching the
vehicle.
THE COURT: What does "on the floor" mean?
Under something or -THE WITNESS: No, it was just in front of
the seat on the floor.
THE COURT: Front and center in plain
view?
THE WITNESS: In the passenger plain view.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. JEWELL:
Q.

Now, Officer Jensen, you indicated you

were not the first person to search the vehicle.
A.

No, I was not.

Q.

And who were the two officers that you

mentioned that had searched the vehicle before you
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had?
A.

Detective Johnston and Adamson had already

found some items of controlled substance and
paraphernalia and so forth in the vehicle.
Q.

But it was you who located this cassette

that you've described?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And this type of vehicle, is there a bench

seat or are they bucket seats?
A.

They are bucket seats.

Q.

Two-door or four-door?

A.

I don't recall.

I believe it was two-door

with a hatchback.
Q.

And when you entered the vehicle to search

through it, which door of the vehicle did you
enter?
A.

The driver's.

Q.

And from that perspective of the driver's

side did you notice the cassette on the floor?
A.

Yes, I was kneeling on the front driver's

seat looking under the seats and around, when I
picked up the cassette and found the baggies
inside•
Q.
floor.

Now, this cassette was described on the
Was it underneath the floor mat or was it
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in plain view?
A.

It was in plain view,

Q.

And what was the cover of the cassette --

excuse me.

If the cassette cover were not open,

what would it read on the outside?

Was it a music

group or something like that?
A.

No, it wasn't a music group.

It was a --

I don't recall the brand name, but it had the
regular package of a cassette, the paper on the
outside, so you couldn't view the contents inside.
It wasn't clear.

It had a paper lining in it.

Once I opened that, there wasn't a cassette in it
and I found the three baggies of meth in them.
Q.

So what you're saying is like it was a

type of cassette, Sony or whatever?
A.

Yeah, something like that.
THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand.

Was

it an actual cassette?
THE WITNESS: It was a cassette case.
THE COURT: It was a case, not a cassette.
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
Q.

BY MR. JEWELL: Now, in finding this item,

you opened it.

Then after that point you found

something inside?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

And what did you remove from inside that

container?
A.

There were three baggies which contained a

powdered substance that field tested positive for
methamphetamines.
Q.

Did you yourself conduct that field test?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Who did conduct that field test?

A.

Officer Billings.

Q.

Did you ever fingerprint the cassette

casing that you've described?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Was anything found on Mr. Doyle which

indicated that he had any kind ownership of that
cassette?

Maybe another cassette with the same

brand name on it or anything?
A.

Not to my knowledge.

I didn't have any

contact with Mr. Doyle in searching him.
Q.

Did you question Mr. Doyle at all?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Did you videotape anything at the scene?

A.

No, I did not.
MR. JEWELL: I don't have any further

questions for this witness.
MR. MADSEN: Nothing further, your Honor.
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I might briefly recall Detective Johnston,
THE COURT: Okay.
(Denton Johnston retakes the witness stand)
REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MADSEN:
Q.

I remind you, Detective Johnston, you're

still under oath.

You testified earlier about

finding a cassette case inside the coat; is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you do with it?

A.

Set it on the floor of the vehicle.

Set

it on the floorboards of the car.
Q.

Did you see the cassette case after the

meth was removed from it?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Was that the same one you removed?

A.

It was the same one.
MR. MADSEN: I have no more questions.
THE COURT: I didn't follow that.

You

discovered it first?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, it was in the
jacket pocket with the rest of the paraphernalia,
but I overlooked it as paraphernalia.

Did not look

inside, open the case up and look inside.

I set
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it down on the floorboard, went back to looking
through the jacket.
THE COURT: Did you find the jacket in the
car
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I did.
THE COURT: Where?
THE WITNESS: It was in between the two
seats
THE COURT: Between bucket seats?
THE WITNESS: Between the bucket seats on
the console.
THE COURT: You searched the jacket?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir I did.
THE COURT: Removed the case from the
jacket?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Set it on the floor in about
the area where -- I'm sorry -THE WITNESS: Officer Jensen.
THE COURT: •- Officer Jensen said he found
it?
THE WITNESS: I recall setting it on the
driver's side floorboards.
THE COURT: You don't remember putting it
on the passenger's.
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THE WITNESS: No, sir.

I recall I was

kneeling on the driver's seat searching the jacket
that I had found and setting it on the floorboards
of the driver's side.
THE COURT: So if somebody moved it over
there, somebody else did that?
THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir.
Jensen came out to assist.

Officer

I took the jacket

outside of the vehicle to finish searching.
THE COURT: But you think you put it on the
driver's side because that's where you were?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
RECROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. JEWELL:
Q.

Officer Johnston, did you do any weighing

of these items which were (inaudible) by Officer
Jensen?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Did anybody else do any weighing of these

items?
A.

That evidence, I did not handle that

evidence, as far as the controlled substance that
we found.
Q.

Did you ever question Mr. Doyle?
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A.

I did not.

Q.

I think before you previously testified

you never videotaped any of this.
A.

No, I didn't.
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions.
REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MADSEN:
Q.

How long have you been a narcotics

officer?
A.

About a year and a half.

Q.

Do you have experience with both sales and

possession of individuals that have been charged
with both?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Do you have an opinion -MR. JEWELL: Objection, your Honor.

I

don't think this witness has the proper background
to define -MR. MADSEN: Perhaps if he'd let me ask the
foundational questions before he interrupts about
objecting to foundation.
THE COURT: I don't know what he's going to
ask yet.
Q.

BY MR. MADSEN: Do you have a professional

opinion based on your experience with regard to
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possession and distribution as to whether three
bags would indicate possession with intent to use
or possession with intent to distribute?
MR. JEWELL: Well, I don't think that's
foundation, your Honor.

I don't think he should be

entitled to give a (inaudible) opinion on this
issue.

I don't think it's been established that he

had an extensive narcotics background to determine
what's intent and what's not intent as far as
amount of possession.
THE COURT: I don't think the answer could
help me.

I think I would weigh it so little I

don't think it could help me.

I don't think it

matters.
MR. MADSEN: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: I don't know that it's
inadmissible, but I just wouldn't be interested in
the answer, I don't think.
MR. MADSEN: State calls Officer Shawn
Adamson•
THE COURT: Thanks.
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that
the testimony you're about to give in the case now
pending before this Court will be the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
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God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
SHAWN

ADAMSON,

having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MADSEN:
Q.

Would you please state your full name and

occupation.
A.

Shawn Adamson.

I'm a deputy with the Utah

County Sheriff's Department.
Q.

Did you participate in a search on the

11th of November at the Hundley trailer?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Were you present when Shane Doyle and

Ms. Olsen arrived at that trailer?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

Did you participate in the search of

Mr. Doyle's vehicle?
A.

I did.

Q*

Did you in fact interrogate Mr. Doyle

after his arrest or after the search?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Had he been Mirandized?

A.

He was.
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Q.

Did he make election to make any

statements to you?
A.

He indicated to me that he understood his

rights and agreed to speak with me.
Q.

Did you asked him regarding the ownership

of the items of paraphernalia and the bags of
methamphetamine that had been removed from the car?
A.

I did.

Q.

What did he say to you?

A.

He said that they were his and that the

lady that was in the car when they arrived had
nothing to do with it.
MR. MADSEN: I have no further questions,
your Honor.
CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. JEWELL:
Q.

Officer Adamson, you testified you were

present when Mr. Doyle arrived; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And how did he arrive?

A.

They arrived in a white compact car, a

small car, and came to the front door of the
trailer.
Q.

And Mr. Doyle was not the driver?

A.

That's correct.
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Q.

Now, over here on the board we have a

diagram that's been done by Officer Johnston.
just want you to take a glance at this.
can get situated with this diagram.
A.

Yeah, I recognize it.

Q.

This is No. 121.

Fine.

I

Maybe you

This is north.

Would it be fair

to say that this van parked in front of the trailer
is -- this car, excuse me, parked in front of the
trailer, would that accurately represent the van
that you arrived in?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And would it be fair to say that this car

here with the little triangle in it parked in
front of the other trailer would be the car that
Mr. Doyle arrived in; would that be accurate?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So those locations are fairly accurate?

A.

It appears to be accurate to me, yes.

Q.

And then this would be -- this area right

here just south of the trailer before you reach the
next trailer would be a parking pad; would that be
accurate?
A.

I believe that's what it is.

I can't

recall whether or not it was occupied by a vehicle
at that time.

J w
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Q.

Now, at the time the warrant was executed,

what was your duties as far as the actual search?
Were you to go in and search?

Were you questioned?

What was your duty at the time the warrant was
actually executed on the house?
A*

I was assigned as the initial approach

officer -- or one of the initial approach officers.
Two of us walked to the front door and knocked on
the door.
Q.

That would be you and Officer Leavitt?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And at the time that you knocked on the

front door, someone answered?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Who was that?

A.

Mr. Hundley.

Q.

Did you tell Mr. Hundley the purpose of

your visit?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you hand him the search warrant?

A.

It was provided to him, yes.

It wasn't

done immediately or right at that point.
Q.

Oh, at what point was it handed to him?

A.

I didn't see it given to him.

Q.

Who would have been involved with that?

sS w
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A.

The case officer, which in this case would

have been Devon Jensen, I believe,
Q.

Now, at the time that you stated the

purpose of your visit to Mr. Hundley, did you
request the services of other officers?
A.

There were other officers present and

waiting for us to get through the front door.
Q.

And did you eventually

(inaudible)?

A.

Yes, they came in of their own accord.

Q.

And you conducted a search at that time?

A.

We did.

Q.

Who was present when you began conducting

that search?
A.

From memory I didn't list the officers in

my report.
Q.

I'm sorry, I meant the people at the home,

not the officers.
A.

Oh, the suspects?

There was Mr. Hundley

and Mrs. Hundley.
Q.

Was there anyone else in the home?

A.

A small child.

Q.

But as far as the adults it was only

Mr. and Mrs. Hundley?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And then the search was begun?
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A,

Yes.

Q.

Now, were Mr. and Mrs. Hundley eventually

placed under arrest?
A.

They were.

Q.

And who was responsible for doing that?

A.

I believe again Devon Jensen.

possibly Andre Leavitt, as well.
initial contact with Mr. Hundley.

Well,

He made the
I don't know who

placed them under arrest.
Q.

Were they -- do you recall if they were

placed under arrest prior to the arrival of
Mr. Doyle in this white vehicle that you've
described

earlier?

A.

I believe that they were.

Q.

Were they actually transported and pulled

out of the house before Mr. Doyle arrived?
A.

I think that they were.

Q.

What about the small child?

A.

The child, someone had come to take that

child.
Q.

And that was before Mr. Doyle arrived in

this car?
A.

I believe it was.

Q.

How much time elapsed between when you

knocked on the door to state the purpose of your

•0^0
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visit and when Mr. Doyle arrived in this white
vehicle?
A.

I couldn't say exactly, but somewhere

around 40 minutes.
Q.

Okay.

Between 40 minutes and an hour.

Nov, you've testified you had an

opportunity to question Mr. Doyle; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And where did this questioning take place?

A.

In the living room at the trailer.

Q.

Had you told Mr. Doyle he was under arrest

at that point?
A.

He was under arrest at that point.

Q.

Had you told him that?

A.

He was in handcuffs, as I recall.

Q.

And who had placed him in handcuffs?

A.

I had.

Q.

And at what point did you place him in

handcuffs?

When he arrived at the door or

(inaudible)?
A*

After we had found the items of

paraphernalia that tested positive for
methamphetamine in his pocket.
Q.

So between when he arrived at the door and

when you put the handcuffs on him, did you say,
••You need to stay here.

We're going to search your
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car." or what happened?
A.

He was placed under arrest and maintained

in custody there at the living room of the trailer.
Q.

Until the search could be done to the car?

A.

No.

Q.

I'm sorry, I want you to give me the

He was awaiting transport.

chronological order of things.
A.

Right.

He came in the door.

Q.

Okay, he comes in the door.

A.

I searched him.

Q.

You searched him.

A.

I found paraphernalia.

Q.

You found paraphernalia.

A.

It was tested.

Found to be -- to test

positive for methamphetamine.
Q.

And at that point you --

A.

He was placed under arrest.

Q.

And then after that the car was searched?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And you've testified that this interview

took place in the living room; is that correct?
A.

Correct.

<J.

And were there any other officers present

when this interview took place?
A.

Oh, yes, there were several around.
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Q.

Were there any with you listening to the

interview?
A.

No, not participating specifically with

the interview, no.
Q.

Was there a recording either video or

audio made of this interview?
A.

No.

Q.

You indicated that that's when you believe

you read him his Miranda rights.
A.

I did advise him of his rights as per

Miranda.
Q.

And you've testified that he indicated he

understood those rights.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And he agreed to talk with you?

A.

He did.

Q.

And when he agreed to talk to you you

stated that he indicated that the items found
within the coat in the car were his; is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How was it that -- did you ask him

specifically?
w

Did you show him the items and say,

Is this yours?11 or how was it you asked him about

the items?
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A.

No, I told him that we had found three

bindles of methamphetamine and a butane torch and
some other items of paraphernalia.

Specifically

there was a pipe that was found in a cigarette
package that was on the dash.
All of the other items of drugs and
paraphernalia were found in the leather coat that
was in the car.

I described these things to him

and asked him if they were his.
Q.

And after so doing what was his indication

to you, if any?
A.

He said that they were his.

That they

were planning on going with the Hundleys to
Salt Lake.

They were going to go up to a club

there, and that he was taking his meth up there for
that purpose.
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions of
this officer, your Honor.
MR. MADSEN: Nothing further, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. MADSEN: The State rests.
THE COURT: Will we hear from anyone else?
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you going to present any
evidence?
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MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you want argument?
MR. MADSEN: Just briefly, your Honor.

I

think that the possession of methamphetamine in a
drug-free zone with intent to distribute would be a
question of fact for the jury.
As to quantity, as to intent to distribute
or intent to use, I think the only evidence before
the Court is the three bindles, separately packaged
bindles that were located, and that this defendant
acknowledged notice of.
We have not introduced evidence to carry
the Count II, possession of marijuana.

However,

Count III, possession of paraphernalia, they've
testified

(inaudible) that this defendant

(inaudible).
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard?
MR. JEWELL: Yes, your Honor, just briefly.
I do not believe that the State has shown there was
an intent to distribute.

I also believed the State

failed to show that this occurred in a drug-free
zone.

I think at a minimum they have to show what

there is that constitutes a drug-free zone.
THE COURT: Any direct evidence on that?
don't know if I've heard it either.
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MR. MADSEN: I don't remember.
THE COURT: I don't think so.
MR. MADSEN: I do know what the testimony
is.

I'd like to petition to reopen, if the Court

(inaudible).
THE COURT: We'll allow that if it's at
issue.
MR. JEWELL: If the Court's inclined to do
that I would just as soon know specifically what
they're trying to allege the drug-free zone is.
MR. MADSEN: I'd like to recall Officer
Denton Johnston.
THE COURT: Do you believe there was prior
testimony?
MR. MADSEN: I didn't

—

THE COURT: I don't remember it.
just about to ask you if you'd presented

I was
anything

on that, if Counsel didn't bring it up, because if
you did I didn't remember.
MR. MADSEN: Well, he's the one that told
me, your Honor.

It involved the description of the

park.
(Officer Johnston retakes the witness stand)
///
///
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REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY BY MR. MADSEN:
Q.

Inside the Lamplighter, Officer Johnston,

reminding you that you're under oath, are there
areas set aside designated as parks and play areas?
A.

Yes, there is.

Q.

Is there one in the vicinity of this

trailer?
A.

The street that runs east and west, just

north of trailer No. 121, if you was to go one
street over, there was a -- near trailer No. 25
there's a -- not necessarily a clubhouse, but a
maintenance-type shack or a shed there.

By that

there is a fenced area in which gym apparatus,
playground apparatus and such has been set up
within the park itself.
Q.

Is that within a thousand feet of this

trailer?
A.

Oh, definitely within a thousand feet.

I

would say it's within 150 feet of that trailer.
MR. MADSEN: I have no other questions,
your Honor.
CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. JEWELL:
Q.

Officer, so is this area that you've

y.-ij^'.
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described, is it included within the trailer park
itself?
A.

Yes, it sits in the middle.

The trailer

park encircles that area.
Q.

Okay, and what exactly -- you've described

just gym apparatus.

Just briefly tell us what

there is there, if you recall.
A.

I believe there's a swing set, a small

slide, the older type jungle gyms you would find on
elementary school playgrounds.
bars that's there.

Just the maze and

It has a four foot or so

chain link fence around it.
Q.

And this is the area you believe is set

aside for the owners of the trailer park to use?
A.

Yeah, the tenants of the trailer park for

their kids to play on or whatever.
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions of
the officer.
THE COURT: Anything?
MR. MADSEN: No further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Anybody want

argument?
MR. MADSEN: I believe, your Honor, that as
far as that particular element is concerned, that's
met by the designation of that area as a children's
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playground in the presence of an enclosed area
designated as that would provide adequate
(inaudible) designated as a park and play area,
THE COURT: Do you want argument?
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I think that's a
stretch.

I don't know if this is the point in

which to address it, but it's not open to the
public.

I don't think it qualifies as a drug-free

zone.
THE COURT: I don't know either.

I find

that the evidence has to do with the children's
playground is private in nature, not public in
nature.

For the use of the residents of the park.

Isn't that what the showing would be?
I'm going to find that that's probable
cause.

I think that's a specific finding on it.

I

frankly don't know if that's within the meaning of
the statute or not.

It enhances it.

enough for probable cause.

I think it's

I bind over.

The

State's carried the burden of proof and I bind
over.
MR. JEWELL: On Counts I and III
(inaudible).
THE COURT: Yes.

I don't know that they

dismissed it, but they acknowledged that they

3w-0
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didn't make a showing on Counts I and III.
marijuana.

Not the

Whichever the marijuana is, it is not

bound over.
COURT CLERK: January the 5th at 8 o'clock,
Judge Park.
THE COURT: For that day and hour.
you.

Thank

We're in recess.

(Hearing concluded)

\*
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on January 31, 1995)
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Shane
Doyle.

Are you ready, Mr. Jewell?
MR. JEWELL: We are, your Honor.

As a

preliminary matter we'd like to have the Court make
two corrections on the memorandum which was filed
in this matter.

On page 6 of that memorandum, that

first paragraph in the middle of the page -THE COURT: Is the memoradum numbered?
MR. JEWELL: No, it's not, unfortunately.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JEWELL: The paragraph that kind of
starts in the middle of the page there.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. JEWELL: Okay.
Constitution.
14.

I cite to the Utah

It should read Article 1, Section

It's typed as Article l, Section 12.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JEWELL: And then on the next page,

page 7, in the bold lettering up at the top once
again, where it says, "Article 1, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution," it should read Article 1,
Section 14.
THE COURT: Got it.

Mr. Madsen, are you
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ready?
H

MR. MADSEN: We are, your Honor.

1

THE COURT: You may proceed.

[\

Are you going

forward or do you want -MR. MADSEN: (Inaudible) partly, your
I'm here to respond.

The presumption is

i

Honor.

1

that the magistrate did not error.

That the

magistrate issued a valid search warrant.
search warrant was validly executed.
i

The

It's there

burden to prove otherwise, so I'll let them go
forward

.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I believe that
we've raised all the issues in our memorandum.

The

State h asn't responded in writing, so I think that
the State needs to respond to the memorandum which
we have submitted to the Court.

Then based on

their response we'll reply to that.
THE COURT: Well, okay.

Do you just want

to hold yours for reply?
MR. JEWELL: Well, I've raised four points
in the imemorandum.
writing

The State hasn't responded in

I think they need to respond to that

before we can even make a reply.
THE COURT: All right.

If you don't want
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to put forth your case, even though I have a
memorandum.

Sometimes Counsel likes to highlight

parts of that memorandum, but if you want to hold
it until reply then we'll have Mr, Madsen.
MR. JEWELL: I'd need to know the States
response in each of the points in the memorandum.
I think we've laid out sufficiently the grounds for
the motion.

I think we've laid out why we believe

the motion's overbroad, that it's unconstitutional
that -THE COURT: You said the motion's
overbroad.

You mean the search warrant?

MR. JEWELL: The warrant's overbroad,
correct.

I think those are all laid out in the

memoradum.
clarity.

I think they're laid out with extreme
The State hasn't responded to any of

that.
THE COURT: The cases that you've cited,
let me ask you some questions, then.

The cases

that you've cited does not go particularly to the
search warrant itself and how broad that search
warrant may be.

Now, do you have any particular

cases that limits the breadth of the search
warrant?
MR. JEWELL: I understand what you're
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saying, because what has happened is the Courts
have outlined what the standard is f but they have
not necessarily applied that standard to a search
warrant case.
THE COURT: Well, let me narrow it down a
little for you.

As I read your memorandum it

appears to me that you're attacking the search
warrant itself, saying it's vague, too broad.

It

appears to me that you maybe ought to be attacking
the conduct of the police officers as going beyond
the search warrant itself.
MR. JEWELL: Well, I think as I stated in
my memorandum, since the warrant is overbroad
and therefore unconstitutional, the search is
impermissible and violates both the Fourth
Amendment and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. I think that's -THE COURT: Now, where is the search
warrant unconstitutional, with some particularity?
MR. JEWELL: Well, for example, looking at
the search warrant itself as it's attached as part
of the addendum to the motion, it states, "Your --"
y-o-u-r, "are also hereby

(inaudible) to search of

any out-buildings, curtilage, vehicles and the
person of any individual present at the time of the
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execution of this warrant.11
It fails to identify where these outbuildings are located.

It fails to identify where

these vehicles are located.

It fails to identify

where these people are going to be located that
should be searched.
If the warrant wanted the people, outbuildings and vehicles to be searched, those items
present at the residence, it should have so stated.
The way it's stated in the search warrant, it would
allow someone to search the buildings of the nextdoor neighbor, someone out on the street.

It

doesn't conform to the form of particularity
required.
THE COURT: You're going too fast for me.
Where did you read from?
MR. JEWELL: Okay.

Are you looking at the

last page of the search warrant?
THE COURT: I am.
MR. JEWELL: Okay.

The paragraph where it

states, "Now, therefore, you and each of you."
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. JEWELL: If you'll look at the last
sentence of that paragraph.
THE COURT: Okay.

Okay, now go ahead and
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tell me again what your problems are with that.
MR. JEWELL: As that sentence is written,
it is unclear as to where these people, outbuildings or vehicles are located that are
permitted to be searched by the warrant.
If it meant the people, out vehicles and
out-buildings at the residence, it should have so
stated.

But as it is stated in the warrant, it is

unclear.

If we are to follow through on the

authority granted by this type of sentence, it
would allow the police to search anyone on the
sidewalk, the buildings of the neighbors next door,
people who were in no way associated with that
residence.
Furthermore, there needs to be some
particularity as to why these other people should
be searched.

As it is stated in the memorandum and

case law, the Fourth Amendment protects people.
How can a magistrate grant authority to search all
people?

There's got to be some particularity.

There's got to be some probable cause, some reason
to have those people searched.
Now, on the affidavit, the affidavit cites
that the police believe that Steven Hunley is
selling drugs.

When they go to search the garbage
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can, they find four respondents to both Steven
Hunley and Angela Hunley.

There is no mention in

the affidavit whatsoever of Mr. Shane Doyle.

There

is no mention in the search warrant of Mr. Shane
Doyle.
How can a magistrate grant broad authority
to search any person that might be present at a
place?

There has to be particularity or a reason

to search that particular person.

It's not enough

that someone there might be involved in the sale or
usage of drugs.

There has to be particularity as

to that person.
It's overbroad to allow anybody to be
searched.

That means if the grandparents were

visiting for the weekend, they could be searched.
That means the milkman who knocks on the door in
the morning can be searched.
searched.

Anyone can be

That's too broad.
THE COURT: So that's what you're saying

this warrant says to you?
MR. JEWELL: I'm saying that the warrant
as written is overly broad.

There's failure to

establish particularity to search all persons
present.
Moreover, the warrant doesn't identify
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where these people, vehicles or buildings are.
It doesn't say that these people, vehicles and
buildings are within the curtilage or at the
residence or anything else.
It's so broad that an officer could
reasonably take the information provided in the
warrant and go search areas that have nothing to do
with that household or residence.
THE COURT: Okay.

Anything further?

MR. JEWELL: Yes, your Honor.

Furthermore,

besides the fact that the warrant is overbroad and
fails to establish with particularity the probable
cause for why Mr. Doyle should be searched, when
Mr. Doyle arrived at the residence, according to
the officers who testified at preliminary hearing,
he arrived anywhere from 40 minutes to an hour and
15 minutes after they'd begun their search.
The camera, the video camera they'd been
using to film what was going on had been placed
away.

Essentially they had come to the end of

their purpose for searching.

The officers are not

permitted to sit around the house and wait for
three days to see who might show up.

That's

impermissible.
If they've fulfilled the purpose of their

134

10
search, there's no reason for them to stay there
any longer.

Therefore, the timing of the arrival

of Mr. Doyle was after the timing as described in
the warrant.

According to the warrant it says --

last line of that paragraph, the last page of the
warrant says, "At the time of the execution of this
warrant. fl
Well, when the officers went in to execute
it, Mr. Doyle wasn't present.

The people who were

present were the two Hunleys and a child.

By the

time Mr. Doyle had arrived, as I stated earlier,
anywere between 40 minutes to an hour and 15
minutes after the officers had arrived at the
house, the Hunleys had apparently been taken away.
So had the child.
away.

The video camera had been put

They were essentially done with the search.
If the officers were allowed to remain

there as long as they want, they could stay there
several days and wait and see who shows up.
not what this warrant is designed to do.

That's

The

warrant is designed for a particular purpose.
The purpose is to go and search the
residence of these people, because they're the
people against whom probable cause has been
established, at least for the purposes of the
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magistrate who signed the warrant.

To allow them

to go beyond that is unconstitutional.

It's

inappropriate and violates the Fourth Amendment and
Article 1# Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
The car in which Mr. Doyle arrived,
according to the officers, was parked in front of
not the Hunleys trailer, the trailer that's being
searched, but rather in front of the neighbor's
trailer.
Even if the warrant is corrected by
looking at what the affidavit states, the officers
cannot reach that car because it's not within the
curtilage of the home.

It's out on the public

street where other cars are parked.

They do not

have authority to go and search any car on the
street.

You need probable cause to search that

car.
It's not enough that it states that a car
present at the residence.

If a car is not at the

residence when they arrive, and even when they come
out later to search the car it's still not at the
residence, that's not appropriate.

That would

allow them to search any car on the public street
within a few blocks of the residence.
The warrant is overbroad, vague and
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violates both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, as the timing
of the search of Mr. Doyle and the car violates the
wording in the warrant as described, which states,
"At the time of the execution of this warrant," and
as the car was outside of the scope of the
authority of the warrant.
Even if you don't find the wording in the
warrant is vague and unconstitutional, it's still
outside the scope of the warrant because it's not
parked at that property.

It's parked away from the

property on the street in front of the neighbor's
house.
We believe that anything that resulted
from that search, such as statements from Mr. Doyle
and any evidence derived there from the illegal and
unconstitutional search should be suppressed as
(inaudible).
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen.
MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, I think the Court
has began to sum up the State's position.

The

reason we haven't filed a response is I didn't
really quite know what to respond to.
The fact that a search warrant may not be
overbroad is true.

But in this case the search
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warrant is very specific.

The case law developed

that you couldn't search individuals unless they
were provided for in the search warrant.

So

they've gone to great pains to make sure that
individuals present are included in the search
warrant.
The Court would have to find that a
magistrate either is inherently without power to
order the search of the individuals present at
the cite of the search warrant, or that it is
unconstitutional and overbroad to do so.
is not accurate.

It simply

It is not overbroad and it is not

unconstitutional for a magistrate to direct the
search of individuals if there is some nexus.
In this case, the cases cited, a primary
case deals with a bar, where a search warrant was
obtained for a bar and the bartender, and they
searched all the patrons.
overbroad.
place.

They said that that was

This isn't a bar.

This isn't a public

This is a private residence, and the

allegation was that they're dealing drugs out of
the private residence.

Now, that was what was

presented to the magistrate.
The Court would have to find that the
magistrate is without power to issue a search
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warrant that provides for the search of individuals
at that scene, unnamed individuals.

I think it's

fatuous to argue that we didn't say where those
individuals were.
individuals are.

We don't know who those
We named the individuals that

owned the property.

We have no way of knowing in

advance who will be present.
Also, the argument that curtilage and
out-buildings are not described begs the fact that
curtilage and out-building is a description.
a term of art.

It has a legal meaning.

legally defined.
a specific place.

It is

It is

Curtilage is a specific location,
It is its own definition.

building is its own definition.

Out-

Persons present

and vehicles present carries its own definition.
It is at the location of the search.
The search is very specifically
It's described by color.
location.

described.

It's described by

It's described by street address.

described by number.

It's

It's very particular about

what sites is being searched.

That goes to the

overbroad.
The constitutional is the same argument.
To reach an argument that it is unconstitutional
for a magistrate to issue a search warrant that
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provides for the search of persons present at a
suspected site for the distribution of controlled
substanc e is simply inaccurate.
If they had provided information adequate

1

for their warrant the magistrate does have the
power to provide for the search of the persons
named or unnamed who are present where the illegal
activity is alleged to be occurring.
It is not vague in the least.
the loca tion.
art.

It names

It names curtilage, a legal term of

It names out-buildings, a legal term of art.

It names vehicles, which is clearly not overbroad.
Everybody knows what a vehicle is.

It names

persons, which are real individuals that are
present where that search is being conducted.

If

they are present where they have the legal right to
search, 1 they have the legal right to search them.
As far as not being present at the scene
or durin<j the execution of the warrant, that
warrant .is being executed from the time the
officers take possession of the property until the
time that they relinquish possession of the
property

That property is still in their control.
To say that they should have been faster

and should have been out completely begs the fact

140

16
that they were not.

They were still in the

execution of the warrant.

The property was still

under their control.
To argue that the vehicle does not have a
nexus to this search completely ignores the fact
that this defendant arrived, went to the door,
knocked on the door and entered the trailer where
the search was being conducted.

Only then to

discover that the people who were inside were
policemen.

Not the people that he was there to

see, who are the named suspected drug dealers.
That they removed from this individual at
that time drug paraphernalia.
was placed under arrest.

Then the defendant

The nexus to the vehicle

is that that's the vehicle that brought him to the
scene.
for him.

It is present at the scene.

It's waiting

It's waiting for him to leave, and the

officers searched it at the scene.
THE COURT: Did he search with or without
permission?

As I understand he was a passenger,

not the driver.
MR. MADSEN: Well, they did not ask for
permission to search the vehicle.

Vehicles present

during the search are named in the warrant.
search is still ongoing.

The

The officers are still

141

17

J present.

They are still conducting the search.

M The premises is still under their control.
I

Now, to draw to the (inaudible) that they

J are not entitled to sit there three days, that's
> entirely the question that they were not and did
J not.

They didn't search the milkman.

search the grandparents.
pizza boy.

They didn't

They didn't search the

They searched the individual who came

and knocked on the door at the house where the
allegations are that the people are selling drugs
to people that are doing exactly that.

They're

coming and knocking on the door and buying drugs.
That's what this defendant did.

He came

inside the place, was searched, and paraphernalia
was found.

Illegal paraphernalia.

When the

vehicle was searched, three -- I believe it was
ounces or at least three baggies of methamphetamine
were removed from the vehicle.

The vehicle is

there present at the site of the search because it
delivered this defendant there.
The testimony at the preliminary hearing
was it was parked at the first available parking
space.

That there was already a vehicle in place

directly in front, and it parked directly behind.
It's as present as it can get, without parking on
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top of another vehicle.

It can't get any more

present at the location where they were.
It wasn't overbroad.
named what can be searched.

It specifically
It wasn't vague.

It

specifically identifies it to say that it is too
vague if it doesn't say who the people are and
where they are.
Defense counsel even wants a search
warrant that says,

,f

We will seek to search the

following people, and this is where they are."
Which means that from the -- the search warrant
could be executed any time for ten full days.

From

the time it's prepared to magistrate approves it,
it can be executed up to ten days later.
To say that vagueness requires that we
identify where people will be and which people will
be there during that ten day period at the exact
minute that the officers enter completely

belies

the legislative intent, it belies the language of
the statute, and it belies the realities of the
warrants.
It isn't a warrant that's executable at
one minute of one hour of one day, and you
therefore must name everybody and where they'll be
standing at the time that it's executed.

There's
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no way to know in that ten-day period who's going
!

to be there when you get there.
The nexus is provided by the affidavit,

t

was presented to the magistrate,, which says, "This

J is the activities that we believe is going on at
This is how they're conducting

J this home.
business.

We want a warrant to allow us to search

peo pie who might be there, and the people who are
listed as owning the place, and any out-buildings
and vehicles and anything within the curtilage."
That isn't overbroad.

It isn't vague.

It' s not unconstitutional, and the fact that this
def endant arrived an hour into the search -- if
he' d arrived ten minutes into the search is that
permissible?
search.

If he'd arrived one minute into the

I mean, (inaudible) to discuss the three

day s that they sa y the officers weren't permitted
to sit there.

If he'd arrived as the officers hit

the door or just after they hit the door, where do
you draw the line ?
It's dur ing the execution of the warrant.
The magistrate made that clear.

During the

execution of this warrant you may search
individuals that are present.

He was there during

the execution of the warrant.

The officers still
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had custody of the premises.
opened the door.
into the house.

He knocked.

They

They're the ones that let him
They still had custody and

possession of it and the search is ongoing.
I think all of those arguments fall by the
facts.

Not by what might have, could have, is

argumentably possible in (inaudible), but what
really did happen.
got a warrant.
do.

What really happened is they

They did what they were supposed to

They provided information to the magistrate.

They told the magistrate why they needed to search
this place, search the buildings and search the
individuals that might be there.
The magistrate agreed with them and gave
them a warrant that named the building, the outbuildings, the vehicles and persons that might be
there.

Not by name, but by car and location during

the execution of the warrant at this site.

They

executed it exactly pursuant to the directions from
the magistrate.

At that site, persons who were

present during the execution of the warrant.
I believe that all of the arguments fail.
The cases cited did not apply to name -- there are
certain cases where individuals are searched where
no individuals are named in the warrant.

They have
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a warrant for a location but not people.

They

search them.
They says,

w

No, it protects people."

So

the officers have been instructed, "You can't
search people unless you provide information to the
magistrate and get a warrant for people.11

They

did.
Now it's overbroad because we couldn't
tell the magistrate where in the building the
people would be standing at the time that we did,
where they would be.
that.

There's no way we can do

There's no way it can ever be done.

physically

It's

impossible.

But they did exactly what they were
supposed to do.

They got exactly the kind of

warrant they were supposed to get.

They executed

exactly the way they were supposed to do it.
THE COURT: Mr. Jewell.
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor.

I

think Mr. Madsen misunderstands our argument.

Our

argument is not that they have to particularize
where in the building such people will be found.
Our argument is that the wording in the
warrant is overbroad because it states, I quote
again, "Your are also hereby directed to search of
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any out-buildings, curtilage, vehicles and the
person of any individuals present at the time the
execution of this warrant."
It does not state where those people,
where those vehicles, where those (inaudible) are.
If the warrant had sought to search those people,
out-buildings, vehicles present at the residence,
it should have so stated.

It did so in the

affidavit but it doesn't do it in the warrant.
The way the wording is in the warrant,
that warrant would literally allow an officer to
search someone who is standing on any yard next
door.

It doesn't say where this person is.

It

says, "the persons present at the time of the
execution of the warrant."

It doesn't say where

they're presen.
That's what's overbroad.

That's what's

unconstitutionally vague about this.

That's why it

violates both the Fourth Amendment, Article 1,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
There needs to be an establishment of
probable cause as to search the people there.

Just

stating, "We want to search everyone there," mere
presence is not enough.

They need to establish

probable cause to do that.
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As the warrant is worded, it is overbroad.
It would literally allow an officer to search
around the neighborhood.

It does not --

MR. MADSEN: But it
MR. JEWELL: No.

—

I'm sorry, this is my

response.
MR. MADSEN: You're sorry?
direction from you.

I don't take my

If I stand up to object, I

expect to address the Court.
MR. JEWELL: Oh, I'm sorry.
you were going to object.

I didn't know

I thought you were going

to say something.
MR. MADSEN: I've got to object at this
point, your Honor.
sentence.

He keeps reading the last

I think we've got to read the full

paragraph.
THE COURT: I've read the full paragraph.
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, we have not stated
that we think the description of the residence is
vague.

Our focus is on that last paragraph where

it gives this broad authority to search people,
vehicles and out-buildings without saying where
those items are going to be found.
As it is right now, it's unclear where
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these people -- it would allow -- even though
the officers did not search someone on the
sidewalk, the problem isn't with the officers.
The problem is the warrant's overbroad.

It's

unconstitutionally vague and it is overbroad.
Another problem is the vehicle.

That

warrant -- even if it's written to say that they
can search the vehicles at the residence -- and
it's not written to say they can search vehicles at
the residence.
We need some clarity.

According to the

diagram drawn at the preliminary hearing, this is
the trailer that's being searched.
to this trailer.
trailer.

This is the pad

This is the next-door neighbor's

This in front -- so the next door

neighbor's trailer is just south and lies just
after the pad to the trailer being searched.
In front of the neighbor's trailer is
parked the vehicle.
vehicle."

We'll call it the "suspect

How can the officers reach from this

house to this suspect vehicle?

There's no way.

It

doesn't fall within the warrant.
Even assuming that the warrant had been
written properly and said that the vehicles, the
out-buildings, the persons or people present at the
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residence, it's outside of the residential area.
It's in front of the neighbor's vehicle.
It doesn't matter that this might have
been the parking spot available.

Does that mean

on the other side of the street a vehicle parked
would qualify?

Because according to the State's

argument, that's what it would.
the other residence (inaudible).
problem.

Well, gee, it's
That's the

It's overbroad.
Even assuming that the -- excuse me.

misstated myself.

I

Even assuming that the warrant

was written correctly and stated with specificity
that it was referring to the people, out-buildings,
the vehicles present at the residence, if the
warrant stated that, even assuming that, this does
not fall within that.

This is outside of the

residential area.
According to what the State has argued,
any car in the street would qualify.

It doesn't

matter if Mr. Doyle stepped out of that car.
doesn't matter.

That

They still have to have probable

cause to search the car.

It's not enough he

stepped out of that car.

He's not even the driver

of the car, for heaven's sakes.
How can they jump from here to here?
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Well, they're trying to say they do it through the
warrant,.

But the warrant doesn't give them that

authority.

The warrant was written

improperly.

You need to assume if it was written properly it
would only include the cars within the residential
area.

This one doesn't qualify.

Otherwise, the

officers are entitled to search any car within who
knows what distance of the residence.

This car

does not fall within this area.
Now, if the warrant had been written the
way the affidavit had been submitted, there would
be more clarity as to which cars, people and outbuildings could be searched.

The affidavit was

more properly worded than the warrant.

But even

assuming it did use that exact same language, this
car does not fall within the scope of the language
even submitted in the affidavit.

It is not at the

residence.
It doesn't matter if four people came out
of the car and went to the residence and they were
searched.

This car doesn't fall within the scope

of even what they asked for in the affidavit.

If

it did, if any car is subject to that, then that is
completely unconstitutional, because it opens up a
pandora's box to allow the police to just go search
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anything because they think there might be a nexus.
That's not enough.

If they didn't get

consent to search the car and there wasn't other
reasons to get at the car -• and in this case
apparently there wasn't because the driver of the
car was someone else -- there's no way they could
reach the search in that car.

Therefore, anything

they found in the car falls outside the scope of
the warrant as it is, and even if the warrant were
written correctly.
overbroad.

The warrant as written is

It's unconstitutionally vague.

At the time of the warrant we reitterate
our argument that the defendant arrived substantial
period of time after the execution of the warrant.
Agreed, he didn't arrive one minute afterwards.

He

arrived anywhere from the officers 40 minutes to an
hour and 15 minutes after the search had begun.
If the State is allowed to just stay
around forever, they could say, ••Well, we're not
done searching the place, •• and they could sit on
it.

In this case apparently they did not.

But

we're not looking at what they did in this case.
We're looking at what authority the warrant
granted.
Our argument is the authority granted by
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the warrant is overbroad, unconstitutionally vague,
and that the car in this matter falls outside the
scope of the warrant, even if it was corrected
through the affidavit.
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question.
Suppose that the actual owners of the property had
their cars parked across the street because there
was no place to park in front of their mobile home.
Would your argument be that they could not search
those vehicles?
MR. JEWELL: I think that if the car was
parked outside the residence of the home and they
didn't state that they wanted to get at the car, I
don't know that they could get at the car because
it's still parked outside that area.

They're only

granted so much authority by the warrant.
I think in that case they'd have a better
argument to have gotten at it through consent of
the owners of the car or by some other means than
issue under the search warrant, because frankly
they'd already called the people off the property.
They can ask for a search warrant to search the car
itself.
In this case we have a person who arrives
in the car with someone else driving, and parked
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1

away from the residence.

2

grant them the authority to search that car.

3
4

THE COURT: Okay.

The warrant does not

Mr. Madsen, do you want

to be heard?

5

MR. MADSEN: Yes, very briefly, your Honor.

6

If you take that paragraph in its totality, it is a

7

description of what can be searched.

81

THE COURT: I'm not going to

9

MR. MADSEN: When you get to curtilage, it

10

—

has to be the curtilage of something.

11

THE COURT: Sure.

12

MR. MADSEN: If it's out-building it

13

has to be of something.

14

"present."

15

trailer.

16

the street or on top of that car.

17

The other is phrased as

There is only one parking pad for this
Everybody else who's present has to be on

Now the question is, "What does

'present'

18

mean?"

19

at this residence?

20

individual who comes up and knocks on that door to

21

gain entry is there in a vehicle, is it present at

22

that residence?

23

If the owner's car is there is it present
Of course it is.

If the

Of course it is.

All of that is very carefully spelled out

24

in this warrant.

25

vague.

It is not overbroad.

It is not

To argue that it has to be physically up on
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the property and named in advance is impossible.
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Jewell?
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: In this case, the Court reading
the paragraph in its totality is convinced that it
is not broad, too broad or vague.

That the general

refers back to general modified by the specific.
Even though the terms out-buildings, curtilage and
vehicles are general in nature, it has to be
modified by the description of the property that is
there.
This property is not only described by an
address.

It's described by color.

It's described

by the numerals 121 of the trim, with the main
entrance facing south.

I can't see that anyone

would think that that should be vague or too broad
under the circumstances, when you go back and read
the paragraph in its entirety.
Court finds that the magistrate has the
constitutional right to issue a warrant which calls
for the search of the curtilage, the vehicles and
the persons of any individuals present at the time
of the execution of the warrant.
Execution of the warrant does not mean the
moment that the warrant is handed to the owners of
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the property.

The execution of that warrant begins

at that point in time when the officers enter the
premises, and it terminates when the officers
leave.
Up to that point in time, if we have a
situation such as this, where a person comes to
that door and then enters into that property, then
it would appear to me that they have all the right
in the world to search that person.
If that person had nothing on him, if he
had no illegal drugs, no illegal paraphernalia,
then the officers would not have any right to
search a vehicle.
But the nexus, as Mr. Madsen has
indicated, is the fact that he had drugs -- or
rather drug paraphernalia on him.
paraphernalia.

Illegal drug

And this is the nexus that gives

them the opportunity.

It's this Court's ruling it

gives them the right, not unconstitutional but the
absolute right to search that vehicle to make a
determination if there is any further drugs.

Once

he's placed under arrest they certainly have the
right to do that.
I don't know who owned the vehicle.
don't know who the driver was.

I

I don't know if any
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permission was ever asked of anybody, but the nexus
there and the case law in this Court's opinion is
pretty clear that authorizes them to do that.
Have I addressed

everything?

MR. JEWELL: I believe so, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, will you prepare an
order consistent with this Court's ruling?
MR. MADSEN: I will, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Jewell to approve form.
Send it to the Court.
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor.
I'm sorry, your Honor.

There was

something else, before Mr. Madsen leaves.

My

client wanted me to address the Court regarding
bail.

Are we still on the record?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. JEWELL: Okay, thank you.

Your Honor,

Mr. Doyle has indicated that he would like the
Court to consider lowering bail in this matter.
He's not asking the Court to OR him, but lower the
bail so that he might have the opportunity to go
out and take care of some matters.
He indicates that if he were released on a
—

if there were a lower bail imposed and he were
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able to make that and be released, he would go live
at an address of 293 North 850 West in Orem.
That's a place where he has lived since July of
'94.
He also believes that he could return to
work for Chadwick Masonry in Provo where he worked
for approximately a year full-time.

He's also

indicated that he's worked construction in this
valley for approximately 15 years.
I think, according to -THE COURT: Well, before you go any
further, the bindover on this says he's on OR on
this case.
MR. JEWELL: On this one?
MR. DOYLE: I've been at the county jail
since November 11th on this case with a $4,000
bondable bail.
THE COURT: Well, just let me look through
the file further.
this case.

The bindover says, "Bail, ROR

Remanded to county jail on other

charges. w
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, Mr. Doyle
indicates that he believes Judge Dimick in Orem
said that you would entertain bail on another
matter based on what happens on bail on this.
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Frankly I don't have any independent
recollection of anything.

What I do have in the

notes I have are $4,000 bond, $2,000 cash on the
30th of November,

I do not recall whether or not

the status on that changed.
So you're saying as far as this Court's
concerned he is OR'd on this matter?
THE COURT: Well, let me go back further
here.
saying.

You might have some merit in what you're
North circuit court -- oh, here we go.

Bail is set at 2,000 cash, 4,000 bond.
a preliminary on December 15th.

That was at

The bindover, for

whatever reason -MR. JEWELL: Is that

—

THE COURT: See if there's anything in the
notes that addresses that.

The note itself taken

during the preliminary examination doesn't say
anything that I can see.
So I don't know why we have the conflict
that bail 2,000 cash, 4,000 bond, and then the
bindover in the case that he's ROR this case
remanded to Utah County on other charges.
MR. JEWELL: The end notes I have from the
bindover is just that Counts I and III were bound
over and Count II was dismissed (inaudible) for
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this, but I don't have anything reflecting the
issue of bail at that time.

I don't know if the

Sta te has an ything different.
MR. MADSEN: The last thing I have shows
$4, 000 bond, $2,000 cash.
THE COURT: Apparently there is some
con flict on the case

So what's your proposal on

the bail?
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, he's suggested an
amo unt maybe in the line of $1,000.

He believes

that's a bond that hie'd be able to make.
MR. MADSEN: Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Madsen.
MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, the criminal
history shows five arrests with two convictions.
One of which was for a drug related offense.

The

quantity of drug which was removed from the vehicle
was substant ial.

Be yond that I know nothing about

the defendant.
THE COURT: Okay.

Do you want to tell me a

little bit albout him .

i

MR. JEWELL: About what?
THE COURT: Your client.
MR. JEWELL: Well, I told you —
did you want to know ?

what else

I told you about his work
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situation, where he'd go,
THE COURT: Give me a little bit about his
criminal background, whether he has a family he's
living with.
MR. JEWELL: Right.
Utah valley.

He has family here in

He's indicated in the past that as

far as there was a possession of cocaine charge
back in either '88 or '89, a Class A misdemeanor
for something, three DUI's, a felony assault in
Wyoming.

He says he has had no charges since 1989.

The only thing that he would have would be possibly
a retail theft in Orem, and he's supposed to have a
trial on that.
THE COURT: And he's married?
MR. DOYLE: I'm currently separated, your
Honor.

I have two children that are in my custody.
THE COURT: In your custody?
MR. DOYLE: Yes.
THE COURT: And Where's your ex-wife?
MR. DOYLE: She's living in Provo.

She has

the children right now but upon my release I will
probably take them over.

She voluntarily gave me

custody of the children.
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, do you have any
suggestions?
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MR. MADSEN: Most of what I'm looking at
is from the A's with the cocaine charge in late
'89, but I also have an August charge of false
information, with no official determination yet.
I don't think that a few thousand dollar
bail for anyone with local contacts, if we make
that cash or bond assurety, it's not only
reasonable bail, it's quite low for the charge.
THE COURT: I'll reduce it to $2,000 cash,
bond or assurety.
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor.
(Hearing concluded)
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
Case No.

vs.

941400879

SHANE DOYLE,
Judge Boyd L. Park
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for a Suppression Hearing, the
Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding, on January 31, 1995.

The Defendant

was present and represented by Michael E. Jewell, Utah County Public
Defender Association, Attorneys for Defendant.

The plaintiff was

represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Craig Madsen.

The Court

having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum and having heard
argument from both Plaintiff and Defendant and being advised in the
premises does hereby make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1)

The general language of the warrant refers back to the

specific language of the warrant--the terms out-building, curtilage
and vehicles are modified by the description of the property.
2)

The property in the warrant is described by address, color,

numerals and the direction which the main entrance faces.
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3) Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person.
4) The Court did not find who owned the vehicle, who the driver
was or whether permission was asked to search the vehicle.

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1) The authority-granting paragraph in the warrant in its
totality is neither too broad or vague.
2) The magistrate has the constitutional right to issue a warrant
which calls for the search of the curtilage, the vehicles and the
persons of any individuals present at the time of the execution of the
warrant.
3) Execution of the warrant does not mean the moment that the
warrant is handed to the owner of the property, but rather the
execution of that warrant begins at that point in time when the
officers enter the premises, and it terminates when the officers
leave.
4) Up to the point in time when the officers leave, they have the
right to search a person who comes to that door and then enters into
that property.
5) The fact that Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person
gives the police the right to search that vehicle to make a
determination if there are any further drugs.

6S

ORDER
The Court, having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum and
having heard argument from both Plaintiff and Defendant and being
fully advised in the premises does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE:
That Defendant's Motion to Suppress be Denied.
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